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Cultural threat and anti-immigrant prejudice: The case of Protestants in

Northern Ireland
The twelve years since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 have seen Northern Ireland emerge from a period of conflict known as 'the Troubles', which had claimed 3,000 lives over 30 years. The process of transition to a stable and peaceful society has inevitably attracted the attention of social scientists and produced volumes of scholarship on the matter. Within social psychology, the research agenda has concentrated, understandably enough, on relations between the protestant community on the one hand, and the catholic community on the other. Social psychologists studying Northern Ireland have typically asked how much, in this postconflict period, these groups trust, like and seek contact with each other, and how the psychological precursors of 'reconciliation' can be brought about (e.g. Cassidy & Trew, 2004; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; Muldoon, Trew, Todd, Rougier, & McLaughlin, 2007; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009 ).
Yet, the years since the Belfast Agreement have seen other changes that are relevant to intergroup relations in the province. Significantly, immigration has added to the previously rather small ethnic minority populations. For example, since the enlargements to the European Union in 2004 and 2007, a small but significant East European population has also become established. Indeed, the arrival of migrants could be read positively as a sign of the 'normality' that politicians and commentators on Northern Ireland crave. Unfortunately, though, the past decade has seen a rise in hostility towards immigrants to the point that Belfast has been dubbed the "hate crime capital of Europe" in the national media on account of the frequency of physical attacks against these new minorities, as well as homophobic and sectarian incidents and attacks on disabled people (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2005) . Media attention peaked in June 2009, when 100 Romanians were forced out of their homes following a series of such attacks, eventually having to leave the country after being told that the police could not guarantee them protection (although they reportedly returned to Northern Ireland some months later). The fact that these particular attacks took place in a protestant area of the city, fuelled a perception that such hostility was particularly prevalent among the Protestant population (Jarman, 2008) .
Hostile reactions to immigration are not particular to Northern Ireland, and in a sense these events can be seen as reflecting a broader pattern observable throughout Europe. However, it may be instructive to consider how racism is connected to the particular social conditions that shape life there. Belfast, for example, is not just any city, but one characterised by exclusive sectarian and ideological residential spaces, whose boundaries are enforced through violence (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2007) .
Furthermore, as we shall explain, the Belfast Agreement itself brought about a number of legal and institutional changes that aimed to undo the institutional dominance of Ulster unionism. These changes, have provoked a widespread sense of resentment and cultural threat that has been termed 'protestant alienation' (Southern, 2007) . Our aim in the current contribution is to probe more systematically the view that Protestants in Northern Ireland have reacted to immigration with more hostility than Catholics have, and to examine why this might be the case.
Cultural threat and attitudes about immigration
One of the recurring themes in the research literature on anti-minority and anti-immigrant attitudes has been that of cultural threat, understood as the sense that an outgroup is in danger of somehow polluting or obstructing the expression of defining ingroup values, identity or traditions (Sides & Citrin, 2007) . A number of studies conceptualising cultural threat in this way appear to confirm its role as a robust predictor of anti-immigrant and anti-minority positions. In the UK, for example, it predicts desire to reduce immigration (McLaren & Johnson, 2007) .
Analysis of multi-national survey data indicates that a perceived cultural threat is predictive of hostile orientations towards immigrants, and of low social and political tolerance of ethnic minorities across multiple European populations (McLaren, 2003; Weldon, 2006) . Furthermore, by using experimental designs within representative surveys in the Netherlands, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004 ) demonstrate the mobilizing potential of cultural threat. Leading people to believe that a group of immigrants will not 'fit in smoothly with Dutch culture' did not merely strengthen the attitudes of people who already oppose immigration, but dramatically increased the proportion of respondents reporting such opposition: from a minority of 35 percent to a substantial majority of 85 percent. Thus, notwithstanding the particularity of anti-immigrant sentiment from place to place, accumulating evidence appears to support a key and reliable role for perceived cultural threat across contexts.
At the same time, however, there is a danger of tautology in demonstrating the link between cultural threat and negative attitudes (2007; see also Sniderman et al., 2004) . Cultural threat is typically measured using questionnaire items that specify minority outgroups as the source of the threat: for example in the 1997 Eurobarometer survey analysed by Weldon (2006) , participants are asked to indicate their agreement with the statement, "the cultural and religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life". Such measures, it is suggested, are likely to elicit agreement from anybody who dislikes the groups in question, regardless of the actual source of the prejudice. Sniderman et al. (2004 , see also Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007 demonstrate the high level of common variance between different forms of threat (for example, cultural and economic, individual and collective) when they are measured using items formulated in this way. They argue that this demonstrates the extent to which traditional threat measures merely tap a generalized antipathy towards the outgroup and that evidence demonstrating statistical relationships between such variables and prejudice has limited value. More useful, perhaps, would be a focus on the states of collective vulnerability that lead the cultural difference of certain groups to be interpreted as alien and threatening. 
Cultural threat in Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, cultural threat has been identified as a mediator of the effect of religious salience on Protestants' attitudes towards Polish immigrants: when the predominance of the Catholic religion among Polish people is emphasised, they are seen as more threatening by Protestants, and hence as less welcome (van Rijswijk, Hopkins & Johnston, 2009 ). This provides an important demonstration of how social categorization processes can alter the extent to which a particular immigrant group is interpreted as culturally threatening. However, we suggest that religious or cultural distinctions per se do not inevitably give rise to cultural threat. Northern Irish Protestants presently perceive a more acute general sense of cultural threat to their group than do Catholics, which, as we shall explain, is rooted in current political circumstances. We argue that this affects their attitudes towards a range of immigrant groups that differ just as much from Catholics in the province than they do from Protestants.
Between Given that the institutionally privileged position of the Protestant unionist population was a central grievance underlying support for the armed Irish Republican campaign against British rule, the peace process in Northern Ireland has inevitably entailed various measures to bring about 'parity of esteem' between the two main communities (Hennessey & Wilson, 1997; Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006 
Method Datasets
The study used data from 
Demographics. The survey included measures of age, gender and social class
(coded by the survey compilers into nine categories based on information provided by the respondents about their employment). We computed eight dummy variables dummy variables from the social class categories. All of these demographic data were used as control variables in the main analyses. As Figure 2 shows, compared to those participants who identified themselves as Catholic, Protestant participants held significantly stronger prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims, Romanian families and migrant workers. There was no difference between the two groups with respect to their attitudes towards Eastern Europeans and other ethnic groups. In terms of participants' political identities, those participants who identified as unionists were significantly more likely to endorse prejudice towards each of the target group except 'other ethnic groups', compared to the baseline group who reported neither unionist nor nationalist identity. Participants who identified as nationalist were significantly more prejudicial than the baseline group only in relation to Muslims and migrant workers. Therefore, although identification as a nationalist in Northern Ireland is not unrelated to anti-immigrant prejudice, there is more consistent evidence for negative effects of a unionist political identity on attitudes towards different ethnic and religious groups. As Table 2 indicates, all five models showed good fit.
Results
Mean differences in prejudice indicators
( Table 2 about here)
The mediating role of cultural threat
Having established the differences between Protestants and Catholics, and between unionists and nationalists, in attitudes towards immigrants and minorities, we set out to investigate the mediating role of perceived cultural threat using data from the 2002 wave of the NILT. Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients amongst the different identity measures, cultural threat and anti-immigration attitude. As can be seen from this table, the strongest relationship is observed between holding an antiimmigration attitude and cultural threat (r = .35). Thus, higher levels of perceived cultural threat are significantly associated with a much stronger negative attitude against immigration to Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Protestant participants showed significantly stronger negative attitudes towards immigration compared to Catholics, as did those participants who thought of themselves as unionist. In contrast, participants who reported a nationalist political identity were significantly less prejudiced against immigration. Finally, both Protestant and unionist participants were significantly more likely to perceive their cultural heritage to be under threat compared to Catholic and Nationalist participants.
( Table 3 about here)
To test the mediating effect of cultural threat on the relationship between religious and political identity, and anti-immigration attitudes, we estimated a structural equation model using latent factors for cultural threat and anti-immigration attitude, as shown in Figure 3 . Again, the co-variances amongst our predictor variables were freely estimated. The results clearly indicate that perceived cultural threat fully mediates the effect of religious identity, but only partially the effect of one's Unionist political identity on anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, participants who identify with either the Protestant or Unionist community are more likely to perceive their cultural heritage to be under threat which is then further associated with a negative attitude towards immigrants in Northern Ireland. To determine the significance of the mediating effects of cultural threat, we used the bootstrap procedure as outlined by Shrout and Bolger (2002) . Based on 1,000 bootstraps, the means of the unstandardized indirect effects of participants' religious identity and unionist political identity on their attitudes towards immigration are .11 with a 95% CI (.047, .181) and .14 with a 95% CI (.057, .226), respectively. Given that neither confidence interval contains the value of zero, we can conclude that perceived cultural threat significantly mediates the relationship between religious and unionist political identities, and anti-immigration attitude. There was no evidence for a mediating effect of cultural threat on the relationship between one's Nationalist political identity and their beliefs on immigration.
Discussion
Our analyses indicate that across a range of target outgroups, Protestants report higher levels of prejudice than Catholics, and that unionists report more prejudice than people reporting no political identity. The difference in prejudice levels between nationalists and people reporting neither political identity is less pronounced, only reaching significance in the case of migrant workers and Muslims. It is important to note that these differences emerge over a number of target groups, and not only those who might be categorized as a religious outgroup by Protestants but not by We found that the higher levels of prejudice among Protestants and unionists is mediated by cultural threat: that is, these respondents see their cultural traditions as being the 'underdog' and as not being protected, and this perception in turn predicts more negative attitudes towards migrant workers. Being a unionist is associated with higher cultural threat over and above the differences between religious groups. Thus, cultural threat mediates both religious and political differences in attitudes towards immigrants.
It must be emphasised that anti-immigrant and anti-minority prejudice are far from absent among the Catholics and nationalists in the sample. There is therefore not the danger of tautology associated with typical intergroup threat measures (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) . We can infer instead that the perceived weakness and vulnerability to cultural threat is indeed meaningfully related to negative outgroup attitudes, rather than threat measures merely tapping a general antipathy towards those groups. This is crucial given our contention that Protestants and unionists experience their cultural traditions to be under threat as a consequence of measures to bring about 'parity of esteem' by undoing the privileged status of Britishness, as opposed to Irishness, within Northern Ireland.
We therefore argue that cultural threat remains an important focus of research, especially on immigration, but that the origins of such threat in political processes need to be elaborated. It is insufficient to regard it merely as a direct reaction to cultural difference, since this would not explain why different groups within Northern 
